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Abstract
We analyze optimal income taxes with deductions for work-related or consumptive
goods. We consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case (called a complex tax system)
the tax authorities can exactly distinguish between consumptive and work-related
expenditures. In the second case (called a simple tax system) this distinction is not
exact. Assuming additively separable utility functions, we show that work-related
expenditures should be fully deductible in the ﬁrst case while deduction rates should
be less than 100 percent in the second case. Under further simplifying assumptions,
we also show that the simple system can be characterized by higher tax burdens on
low income earners and less redistribution.
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11. Introduction
Starting in the 1980s, income tax reforms in many countries focused on lowering marginal
tax rates combined with the attempt to reduce the complexity of tax systems, e.g., by
simplifying the regulations for admissible tax deductions. Most notable were diﬀering
proposals for a ﬂat tax, whose proponents argued that taxpayers would need only a postcard
to ﬁle their returns (see Atkinson, 1995). A move in this direction was the 1986 Tax Reform
Act in the US: it introduced a tax schedule with only two brackets and increased the
standard deduction, which meant that fewer households had to itemize their deductions.
Similarly, recent German tax reforms were intended to decrease marginal tax rates and to
standardize deductions for work-related expenditures.
Our focus is on the observation that the complexity and the rate structure of the tax
systems were reformed simultaneously. We consider an optimal income tax system which
may incorporate tax deductions for work-related expenditures. Following the literature
on optimal taxation, we assume a simple utilitarian welfare function and heterogeneous
individuals. We model complexity of the tax system by distinguishing two cases. In the
ﬁrst case, an individual’s tax payment is based on her income and on a detailed distinction
of whether income is used for consumptive or work-related purposes. We call this the
case of a complex tax system. Our second case deals with a simpliﬁed tax system where
deductible expenditures may include expenditures for consumption goods which are not
(or cannot be) distinguished from work-related goods. That is, the simpliﬁed tax system
requires less information concerning the use of an individual’s income.
The distinction between these two cases is motivated by the observation that for some
goods it may be easy to ascertain whether or not they are used for work-related purposes,
for instance, advanced medical equipment. Others, however, may be used both for con-
sumption and production, say, personal computers or company cars. In this case, it may
be prohibitively costly for the tax authorities to monitor which part of expenditure is for
work-related use and which part consumptive.
Under the assumption of additively separable utility functions, it turns out that work-
related expenditures should be fully deductible in case of the complex system, while deduc-
tion of work-related and consumptive expenditures should be allowed at a rate of less than
100 per cent in the simple system. With utility functions which are separable in all goods,
the simpliﬁed system leads to higher average income and to a shift of the tax burden to
2low income earners. Hence, the simpliﬁed system provides higher (average) incentives to
work and is less redistributive.
The intuitive explanation for these results is based on the incentive constraints which
are at the heart of the problem of optimal taxation. Monitoring work-related expenditures
and allowing for tax deductions mitigates the restrictions implied by incentive compatibility
and thus allows for high marginal tax rates on income. Under a simpliﬁed tax system, tax
deductions imply an additional negative eﬀect by forcing individuals to increase those
consumptive expenditures which are deductible. Hence, optimal tax deductions are lower.
In order to satisfy incentive compatibility the optimal income tax system must be less
progressive.1
Our results are based on well known contributions to the optimal taxation literature.
Starting with the seminal paper of Mirrlees (1971), several authors established that optimal
tax schemes are non-linear and are characterized by marginal tax rates equal to zero at both
the upper and lower end of the income distribution (see for example Atkinson and Stiglitz,
1980). General nonlinear taxation problems with income and excise taxes were considered
by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Mirrlees (1976) and Cooter (1978). When utility is weakly
separable between leisure and consumption, the optimal tax system is characterized by a
nonlinear income tax with zero excise taxes (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Cooter, 1978).
Our model also assumes weak separability, but in addition we distinguish work-related and
consumptive goods. We also eﬀectively study two diﬀerent nonlinear tax problems, where
the complex system is similar to that of Mirrlees (1976) and the simple system has the
additional constraint that two of the goods have the same tax schedule. Kaplow (1990) and
Slemrod (1994) study optimal taxation in models where individuals can reduce their tax
burden by spending part of their income on tax avoidance and evasion activities. Whereas
evasion is illegal, and avoidance may be thought of as an implicit part of the tax code we
consider tax deductions, which are an explicit part of the tax code and characterize the
optimal income tax scheme when tax deductions are incorporated.
In the next section we present our model. In section 3 we focus on tax deductions. In
section 4, we consider the progressivity of the optimal tax system. Under strict separability
on the utility function, we show that the simpliﬁed system leads to higher incentives to work
and to a higher tax burden on low incomes. The last section contains a short conclusion.
1We use the term progressivity here in the sense that there is an interval of low income earners who
pay higher taxes under the simple than under the complex system.
32. The Model
For simplicity we assume that all individuals have identical utility functions but they diﬀer
in a parameter θ which measures the individual’s ability to work. Utility is increasing in
the quantities c and s of two distinct consumption goods but decreases in the eﬀort, e,
which an individual must exert in order to earn income y. The distinction between the two
consumption goods c and s is used to characterize the diﬀerent informational requirements
of the two tax systems considered below. Good s stands for a good whose consumptive
use may not be easily separated from its work-related use (e.g., a personal computer or
company car). While eﬀort is increasing in y, it is decreasing in the quantity q of a work-
related good and in the individual parameter θ. In the case of a computer, q thus measures
the work-related use versus the consumptive use which is captured by s. We assume that
utility is additively separable in consumption and labor:2
u(c,s) − e(y,q)h(θ) with uc,us > 0 and ey > 0 > eq; h
0 < 0 < h. (1)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. We assume that u is strictly concave and that
e is strictly convex in y and q. Furthermore, we will impose the following assumptions on
the utility function:
ucs > ucc, uss and eyq > −eqq.3
The ability to work parameter θ is distributed on an interval [θ, ¯ θ] according to the
distribution function F(θ) with density f(θ) > 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ]. F(θ) is common knowledge,
but only the agents know their individual parameter θ.
An individual’s budget constraint depends on her income y and tax payment t. We
assume linear production technologies for all goods and normalize all prices to one. The
tax payment is a function of y and of the composition of expenditures. We distinguish two
cases: In the ﬁrst case the tax payment depends on expenditures for q and s separately.
The tax function is written as t(y,s,q) and we call this the case of a complex tax system.
In the second case the tax system is simpliﬁed in that the tax function takes into account
only the sum of the expenditures for q and s. We deﬁne k := s + q and write the tax
function as t(y,k). That is, if the tax system allows for tax deductions on k, deductible
expenditures may include expenditures for consumptive purposes.
2In the following we omit the arguments of the functions where this does not lead to any confusion.
3These are suﬃcient conditions for c and s to be normal goods and for the optimal y to be increasing
in θ.
4Given either t(y,s,q) or t(y,k) an individual solves
max
c,s,q,yu(c,s) − e(y,q)h(θ) s.t. y = c + q + s + t(y,·). (2)
In the following we assume that the (optimal) tax functions are diﬀerentiable and involve
no bunching. This allows us to characterize the solutions c∗(θ),s∗(θ),q∗(θ) and y∗(θ) of (2)
by the corresponding ﬁrst order conditions. For the complex tax system we get
uc(1 − ty) − eyh = 0,
us
uc




while the simpliﬁed tax system implies




Furthermore, deﬁning v∗(θ) := u(c∗,s∗) − e(y∗,q∗)h as the indirect utility function the








The government’s aim is to design the tax functions t(y,s,q) for the complex system and
t(y,k) for the simple system such that the sum of individual utilities is maximized subject













t(y,·)f dθ = T. (6)
3. Optimal Tax Deductions
We ﬁrst focus on the optimal tax deductions, i.e., the optimal relation between the marginal
tax rates ty and tq in the complex tax system and ty and tk in the simpliﬁed tax system.
With positive marginal tax rates on income it turns out that while the complex tax system
entails full tax deduction, the simpliﬁed tax system is characterized by less than full de-
duction. The intuition for both results is due to the observation that deductions serve to
decrease the individuals’ eﬀorts. In the complex tax system, with full tax deductions con-
sumers’ eﬀorts are not distorted. Since any redistribution achieved through taxing income
cannot be improved upon by taxing work-related expenditures, full deduction is optimal.
The simpliﬁed system, however, taxes work-related expenditures for q and consumptive
expenditures for s equally. Therefore, tax deductions aimed at increasing q also increase
s. To oﬀset the implied negative eﬀects with respect to eﬀorts and to distortions in the
consumptive expenditures, less than full deduction is optimal.
53.1. Tax Deductions in the Complex System
Considering the complex tax system t(y,s,q) we start by specifying the optimal control
problem for (6). We use y,s and q as control variables and the individuals’ utility levels
v as state variable. Let e c(s,q,y,v,θ) be implicitly deﬁned by the solution of v(θ) :=
u(c,s) − e(y,q)h. Then the Hamiltonian for the government’s maximization problem can
be written as (λ1 and λ2(θ) are the multipliers for the tax requirement and the incentive
compatibility restriction (5), respectively)
H
c = [v + λ1 [y − s − q − e c(s,q,y,v,θ)]]f − λ2e(y,q)h
0 (7)






[y − s − q − e c(s,q,y,v,θ)]f de θ.
Evaluating the optimality conditions for (7) and letting yc(θ),cc(θ),sc(θ) and qc(θ) denote
the optimal solutions, we get the following result.







Proof See Appendix A.1.
Using lemma 1 and employing (3) to characterize the marginal tax rates we get ts = 0
and tq = −ty.4 Hence, we have




and implies full tax deduction.
Proof Substituting (8) and (9) in (3) leads to ts = 0 and ty = −tq. 
4Furthermore, it is easy to show that 0 < ty < 1 (see for example Mirrlees (1971) and (1976), Seade
(1977) and (1982) and Ebert (1992)).
6That ts must be zero is of course well known from the literature (e.g., Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1976). Given the assumption of additively separable utility, an optimal income
tax cannot be improved upon by excise taxes. The result that ty = −tq is optimal is also
in line with this literature, but we stress the implication for deductibility of work-related
expenditures in order to have a benchmark for our simple tax system. The intuition for
the result is simple. Since individual eﬀort decisions are not distorted if ty = −tq, there are
no further welfare gains from imposing ty 6= −tq. Any redistribution from taxing income
cannot be improved upon by not fully exempting work-related expenditures.
3.2. Tax Deductions in the Simpliﬁed System
Turning to the simpliﬁed tax system, the tax function t(y,k) with k = s + q does not
allow the government to inﬂuence q and s separately. Instead, the allocation of k between
q and s is determined by the individuals according to their optimal private decisions, i.e.
us = −eqh (see (4)). To incorporate this observation into the government’s problem to
design an optimal tax function we ﬁrst deﬁne
s(c,k,y,θ) := argmax
s [u(c,s) − e(y,k − s)h].
Let c(k,y,v,θ) be implicitly determined by the solution of v(θ) := u(c,s(c,k,y,θ)) −
e(y,k − s(c,k,y,θ))h. Choosing y and k as control variables and v as state variable, the
Hamiltonian for the government’s maximization problem can be written as (again, λ1 and
λ2(θ) are the multipliers for the tax requirement and the incentive compatibility restriction)
H
s = [v + λ1 [y − k − c(k,y,v,θ)]]f − λ2e(y,k − s(k,y,v,θ))h
0 (10)
s.t. R(θ) = 0, R(¯ θ) = T, v





[y − c(k,y,v,θ) − k]f de θ
and s(k,y,v,θ) := e s(c(k,y,v,θ),k,y,θ).
Evaluating the optimality conditions for (10) and letting ys(θ) and ks(θ) denote the solu-
tions we get:













(uc + eqh)eyqh + ucuss + ucseqh
(uc + eqh)eqqh − ucuss − ucseqh
.
7(i) With uc − eyh > 0, we have −1 < Φ < 0.
(ii) With ucs ≥ 0, we have uc − eyh ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ,θ] and uc − eyh = 0 ⇒ ey = −eq .
Proof See Appendix A.2.
Using lemma 2 and (4) to characterize the marginal tax rates ty and tk implies the next
proposition.5
Proposition 2 (i) With positive marginal tax rates the optimal simpliﬁed tax system





k > 0 for t
s
y > 0.
(ii) For ucs ≥ 0 the optimal tax rates on income are positive, i.e., ts
y ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ,θ], and
ty = 0 implies tk = 0.
Proof (i) Using (4) we get uc − eyh > 0 ⇔ ty > 0 and sign[ty + tk] > 0 for ey < −eq. (ii)
Obviously, uc = eyh ⇔ ty = 0 and ey = −eq ⇔ ty = −tk. Therefore, lemma 2 implies the
proposition. 
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition shows that less than full deduction is optimal if
marginal taxes on income are positive. Since work-related and consumptive expenditures
cannot be distinguished perfectly, any attempt to decrease e by increasing k will also in-
crease the individual’s choice of s.6 Furthermore, comparing us = −eqh with the condition
that characterizes the optimal structure of consumptive expenditures, i.e., uc = us,7 shows
that with ty > 0 full tax deductions would lead to a distorted consumption structure.
Therefore, with positive marginal taxes on income full tax deductions cannot be optimal.
The second part of Proposition 2 establishes that the optimal marginal tax rates on
income are positive as long as ucs ≥ 0 holds. Intuitively, with ucs ≥ 0, negative (marginal)
tax rates on income would induce an increase in y and c which in turn provides a strong
incentive to increase s at the expense of q. Hence, negative marginal income taxes would
5Generally, the marginal tax rates along the optimal expansion path satisfy −1 < ty,tk < 1. Further-
more, the marginal tax rates for θ, θ are zero.
6Using us(·) + eq(·)h(θ) = 0 and eyq > −eqq simple comparative statics shows that an increase in k
leads to an increase of s.
7Noting that ts = 0 in the optimal complex tax system.
8imply rather strong distortions with respect to the choice of y and q. On the other hand,
taxing income positively (at the margin) and allowing for tax deductions reduces y and c
and thus leads to relatively lower distortions with respect to y and q. Note, however, that
this also implies that income which is ﬁnally used for work-related expenditures is taxed
positively.
4. Progression in a Simple Example
The last observation together with the incentive compatibility condition (5) leads to the
conjecture that the simpliﬁed tax system should imply less redistribution. The incentive
compatibility constraints show that the higher the individuals’ eﬀort levels the more their
utilities must increase with their ability to work and the lower the tax induced redistribution
should be.
In the following we will explore this conjecture by comparing the optimal complex
and simpliﬁed tax system. Using further separability assumptions it turns out that the
simpliﬁed system implies that low income earners have to pay higher taxes while the average
tax payments of high income earners decrease. Since the simpliﬁed system also induces
higher average income, it can be characterized as less progressive and less redistributive
than the complex tax system.
We assume that the utility from consumption u(c,s) is additively separable in c and s
and the eﬀort function e linear in y and additively separable in y and q:
ucs = eyy = eyq = 0. (12)
While (12) is quite restrictive, it allows us to compare the allocations induced by the two
systems tc(y−q) and ts(y,k) directly. Using the optimality conditions for (7) and (10) and
deﬁning ∆z := zs(θ) − zc(θ) for z = y,c,s, and q, we get:
Lemma 3 With (12), the optimal tax systems tc(y − q) and ts(y,k) imply
(i) ∆c = 0 and tc
y(yc(θ) − qc(θ)) = ts



























9for all θ ∈ (θ,θ).
Proof See Appendix A.3.
The ﬁrst part of the Lemma shows that the optimal marginal distortion between c
and income does not vary under the complex and the simpliﬁed tax system. As marginal
utility uc and marginal eﬀort ey are not aﬀected by s and q, the two tax systems induce
the same distortions with respect to c and y. While the diﬀerent tax systems may imply
diﬀerent income levels yc(θ) and ys(θ), the optimal income decisions are governed by the
same marginal tax rates.
The second part of the lemma quantiﬁes the distortions with respect to s and q. Note
that these distortions imply that the individuals’ eﬀorts as well as their utility levels in-
crease with the simpliﬁed system if tax payments are disregarded.
However, we know that welfare must be higher under the complex tax regime, that is










Therefore, combining (13) and (15), deﬁning ∆t(θ) := tc(yc(θ) − qc(θ)) − ts(ys(θ),ks(θ))
and using
R θ
θ ∆t(θ)f(θ)dθ = 0 and again (12), the weighted sum of aggregate tax payments
is higher with the simpliﬁed tax system, i.e.,
Z θ
θ
∆t(θ)h(θ)f(θ)dθ > 0. (16)
Finally, employing the incentive compatibility condition (5) we get:
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions in (12), the simpliﬁed tax system is less progressive
than the complex tax system in the sense that
(i) the simpliﬁed tax system induces higher aggregate income,
(ii) individuals with low incomes pay strictly higher taxes and are strictly worse oﬀ com-
pared to the complex tax system.
Proof See Appendix A.4.
10Proposition 2 conﬁrms the conjecture that the simpliﬁed system is less redistributive
and less progressive than the complex system. Redistribution is ultimately targeted at
decreasing the diﬀerences between the individuals’ utility levels, but the Proposition shows
that the diﬀerence between the utility levels at the lower and upper end of the ability
distribution is higher with the simpliﬁed system. With respect to progressivity, there
exists an interval of low ability individuals whose tax payments increase with the simpliﬁed
system. Hence, the average tax payment of the individuals with higher ability levels and
thus higher incomes must be lower than with the complex system.
5. Conclusion
The paper has studied the interaction of the rate schedule and tax complexity in an optimal
income tax model. Complexity was deﬁned with respect to the informational requirements
of the tax system: the more information authorities require from taxpayers, the more com-
plex the tax system. We obtained two basic results from our model: First, tax deductions
are optimal even if authorities cannot perfectly distinguish between work-related and con-
sumptive expenditures. Second, the example showed that the optimal simple system may
be characterized by higher tax burdens on the poor and less redistribution.
In the 1980s, many countries reformed their tax systems towards less progressivity and
less complexity. Of course, this may be primarily due to the distributional objectives of
the conservative parties that came to power at this time. Our model has shown that this
history could also be rationalized in an optimal taxation framework. Our analysis implies
that an increase in the costs of administering a complex tax system and a corresponding
simpliﬁcation of the tax rules might imply less progressive tax rates even if the government’s
distributional objectives remain the same.
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A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The optimality conditions for (7) with respect to y,s and q are
H
c
y = λ1 [1 − e cy]f − λ2eyh
0 = 0, (A.1)
H
c
s = λ1 [−1 − e cs]f = 0, H
c
q = λ1 [−1 − e cq]f − λ2eqh = 0. (A.2)
In addition we have the multiplier equations, the state equations and the boundary condi-
tions:






0(θ) = [y − s − q − e c(s,q,y,v,θ)]f(θ), (A.4)
0 = λ2(θ) = λ2(¯ θ), R(¯ θ) = T. (A.5)




, e cq =
eqh
uc
, e cs = −
us
uc




Substituting (A.6) in (A.2) and solving for us and eq leads to
eq = −ey and us = uc. (A.7)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
In order to prove the Lemma we ﬁrst calculate the optimality conditions for (10). We
then prove part (i) and part (ii).
The optimality conditions for (10) with respect to y and k are
H
s
y = λ1 [1 − cy]f − λ2(ey + eq(−sy))h
0 = 0, (A.8)
H
s
k = λ1 [−1 − ck]f − λ2eq(1 − sk)h
0 = 0. (A.9)
In addition we have the multiplier equations, the state equations and the boundary condi-
tions:





0(θ) + e(y,k − s(k,y,v,θ))h
0, R
0(θ) = [y − c(k,y,v,θ) − k]f(θ), (A.11)
0 = λ2(θ) = λ2(¯ θ), R(¯ θ) = T. (A.12)





















Substituting (A.13) and (A.14) in (A.8) and (A.9) and rearranging yields
uc − eyh =
λ2h0
λ1f
eqh(eyucs + eyquc) − ucey(eqqh − uss)
uss − eqqh
, (A.15)






Solving (A.15) and (A.16) implies
ey = eqΦ with Φ :=
(uc + eqh)eyqh + ucuss + ucseqh
(uc + eqh)eqqh − ucuss − ucseqh
(A.17)
which conﬁrms (11).
To prove part (i) of the lemma note ﬁrst that ey > 0 > eq leads to Φ < 0. To show
that uc −eyh > 0 implies Φ > −1 assume to the contrary that Φ ≤ −1 holds. Then, using
(A.17) we have to consider two cases:
(i) (uc + eqh)eyqh + ucuss + ucseqh > 0 > (uc + eqh)eqqh − ucuss − ucseqh
and (uc + eqh)(eqq + eyq) ≥ 0,
(ii) (uc + eqh)eyqh + ucuss + ucseqh < 0 < (uc + eqh)eqqh − ucuss − ucseqh
and (uc + eqh)(eqq + eyq) ≤ 0.
Case (i) requires uc+eqh ≥ 0. Using ucs > uss this leads to (uc+eqh)eqqh−ucuss−ucseqh > 0
and thus to a contradiction with 0 > (uc + eqh)eqqh − ucuss − ucseqh. In case (ii) we have
uc + eqh ≤ 0. But since ey ≥ −eq and uc − eyh > 0 lead to uc + eqh > 0 we again have a
contradiction. Hence, uc − eyh > 0 ⇒ 0 > Φ > −1.
The proof of part (ii) is again based on a contradiction. We ﬁrst show that uc−eyh ≤ 0
implies uc + eqh ≤ 0. Using ucs ≥ 0 we get that uc + eqh < 0 ⇒ λ2 > 0. However, solving
the multiplier equation (A.10) incentive compatibility requires that λ2(θ) ≤ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ,θ].
Hence, we must also have uc − eyh ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ,θ] and uc − eyh = 0 ⇒ uc + eqh = 0.
Assuming uc − eyh < 0, substituting ey (see (A.17)) on the right hand sides of (A.15)
and (A.16) and dividing these equations reveals
sign(uc + eqh) = sign

eqh(eyqh + ucs) − uc(eqqh − uss)
eqh(eqqh − ucs) + uc(eqqh − uss)

. (A.18)




(eyqh + ucs) > eqqh − uss and
eqh
uc




(eyqh + ucs) < eqqh − uss and
eqh
uc
(eqqh − ucs) < −(eqqh − uss).
Since uc + eqh > 0 ⇔ eqh/uc > −1, ucs > uss and eyq > −eqq imply that in case (i) the
ﬁrst inequality and in case (ii) the second inequality is violated, we must have uc − eyh <
0 ⇒ uc + eqh < 0.
Considering uc − eyh = 0, note that (A.15) either implies λ2 = 0 and thus uc = −eqh





Since ey > 0 > eq requires ucs+eyqh < 0 for (A.19) to hold, using ucs > uss and eyqh > −eqq
shows that (A.19) leads to ey < −eq and therefore to uc + eqh < 0.
Turning to the sign of λ2 and using ucuss+eqhucs < 0 (by the assumption that ucs ≥ 0),
eqqh − uss > 0 and eqh0 > 0, inspection of (A.16) reveals sign(uc + eqh) = −sign λ2/λ1.












θ Γ(ˆ θ)dˆ θd˜ θ with Γ(ˆ θ) := eqsvh
0. (A.20)
Since λ2(θ) = 0 we must have λ1 > 0 and thus sign(uc + eqh) = −sign λ2. Hence,
uc − eyh < 0 ⇒ uc + eqh < 0 ⇒ λ2 > 0.
We complete the proof by showing that incentive compatibility requires λ2(θ) ≤ 0 ∀ θ ∈














Now, assume to the contrary that there exists an interval [θ,θ1] with θ < θ1 < θ such
that λs
2(θ1) = 0, λs
2(θ) > 0 ∀ θ ∈ (θ,θ1) and λs
2(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ1,θ1 + ε) with ε > 0
8This part of the proof is analogous to Seade (1982).
14but small enough. These assumptions imply λs 0
2 (θ) ≥ 0 ≥ λs 0
2 (θ1) which by using (A.21),
λs
2(θ) = λs
2(θ1) = 0 and (A.15), (A.16) also leads to
λ1 ≥ uc|θ=θ = us|θ=θ = ey|θ=θ h(θ) = −eq|θ=θ h(θ) and (A.22)
λ1 ≤ uc|θ=θ1 = us|θ=θ1 = ey|θ=θ1h(θ1) = −eq|θ=θ1h(θ1). (A.23)
(A.22), (A.23) and h(θ) > h(θ1) obviously imply uc|θ=θ ≤ uc|θ=θ1 and ey|θ=θ > ey|θ=θ1.
From strict concavity of u(c,s) and strict convexity of e(y,q) we get uc|θ=θ ≤ uc|θ=θ1 ⇒
cs|θ=θ ≥ cs|θ=θ1 and ey|θ=θ > ey|θ=θ1 ⇒ ys|θ=θ < ys|θ=θ1. Deﬁne ˆ s(c) and ˆ q(y) such that
uc(c, ˆ s(c)) ≡ us(c, ˆ s(c)) and ey(y, ˆ q(y)) + eq(y, ˆ q(y)) ≡ 0,














where the sign conditions follow from ucs > uss and strict concavity of u(c,s) and from
eyq > −eqq and strict convexity of e(y,q). Hence, (A.22) and (A.23) imply cs|θ ≥ cs|θ1 and
ys|θ=θ < ys|θ=θ1. But then the θ1 consumer prefers (ys(θ),ks(θ)) to (ys(θ1),ks(θ1)) which
contradicts incentive compatibility. Repeating this argument shows that with any interval
[θ1,θ2] with θ ≤ θ1 < θ2 ≤ θ such that λs
2(θ1) = λs
2(θ2) = 0 and λs
2(θ) > 0 ∀ θ ∈ (θ1,θ2)
incentive compatibility would be violated. Therefore, we must have λ2(θ) ≤ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ,θ]
which contradicts uc − eyh < 0 for any θ ∈ [θ,θ].
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
To show cc(θ) = cs(θ) we ﬁrst use lemma 1 and (A.3)–(A.5) and (A.20), respectively,
to calculate λc
2(θ) and λs
2(θ). Deﬁning h :=
R θ











h − h(e θ)
i




1 = eyh > 0, (A.24)
which by using (A.1) and (A.8) also reveals cc(θ) = cs(θ). Furthermore, employing (3) and















15To prove part (ii) we can combine (3) and (4) such that with φ ∈ [0,1]





where the deﬁnition of x follows from lemma 1 and lemma 2. Solving usssφ = ey [uc + x]h




> 0, sφ =
eyh(uc + x)
uss
< 0 and sφ + qφ < 0. (A.26)
Substituting sφ and qφ in (A.25) and using uc > eyh we obtain
0 > ussφ − (ey(qφ + sφ) + eqqφ)h, (A.27)
0 > ey(qφ + sφ) + eqqφh. (A.28)
Inequalities (A.26) and (A.27)–(A.28) conﬁrm (13) and (14).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i) is implied by lemma 3 and
R θ
θ ∆t(θ)f(θ)dθ = 0. To prove part (ii) note ﬁrst
that (16) implies that there exists a θ∆t deﬁned by
θ∆t := min






Using θ∆t the following two inequalities which are implied by incentive compatibility and
lemma 3









∆t(θ) ≤ 0 ⇒ v
s(θ) > v
c(θ) (A.30)
lead to ∆t(θ) > 0 for all θ < θ∆t. Assume to the contrary that ∆t(θ) ≤ 0 for θ ∈ [θ,θ∆t].
Since both tax systems are characterized by zero marginal tax rates at the lowest income
levels lemma 3 then implies
v
s(θ) ≥ v
c(θ) for θ ∈ [θ,θ∆t]
with strict inequality for θ < θ ≤ θ∆t. Now assume that there exists a θ1 with θ∆t < θ1 ≤ θ








c(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ∆t,θ1].
16Hence we have vs(θ) > vc(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ∆t,θ1]. Alternatively, assume that there exists a θ2
with θ∆t < θ2 ≤ θ such that ∆t(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ (θ∆t,θ2]. Then, (A.30) reveals vs(θ) > vc(θ)















which contradicts (15). Hence, ∆t(θ) > 0 for all θ < θ∆t.
Finally, applying the same reasoning and using vs(θ∆t) > vc(θ∆t), (A.29) and (A.30)
imply that there exists a θ∆v ∈ (θ,θ∆t) such that vs(θ) < vc(θ) for all θ < θ∆v and
vs(θ) ≥ vc(θ) for all θ ≥ θ∆v.
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